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Summary Paper maps the trends in area of safety-related communication within PROFIBUS and PROFINET industry networks. 
There are analyses safety measures and Fail-safe parameters of PROFIsafe profile in version V2 and their localisation in Safety 
Communication Layer SCL, which guarantees Safety Integrity Level SIL according to standard IEC 61508. The last chapter analyses 
the reaction in the event of fault during transmission of messages. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Standard automation has in the past decades been 
dramatically influenced by the introduction of new 
types of microcontrollers, software, communication 
networks, thus leading to cost reduction, higher 
flexibility, availability and requirements of safety (often 
marked with attribute  Fail-safe). The number of 
applications increases, and special care and special 
safety automation technology in accordance with 
standard IEC 61508 is required. General principles, 
valid for implementation of safety rules for functional 
safety of electrical, electronic and programmable 
electronic safety–related systems are described in [1]. In 
this group belong applications in which run active 
industrial processes (e. g presses, saws, chemical 
factory, transport...). These include the risk to injure 
people, to damage investments or destroy nature and 
system has to guarantee required Safety Integrity Level 
SIL.  
Nowadays, in the area of industrial networks fieldbus 
technology is acceptable standard, which is now widely 
used for transmission of non-safety related and safety 
related control data [2]. The specific utilization of the 
common function within fieldbus communication by the 
specific groups of participants is called a profile. For the 
fieldbus industrial networks are defined (according to 
[3]) seven communication profiles families CPF and 
(according to [4]) ten types of communication protocols. 
Relation between them is shown in Tab. 1.   
Communications protocols of PROFIBUS and 
PROFINET (types 3 and 10) [5] are belonging to 
communication profile family CPF3. 
 
Tab. 1 Relation between CPF and types of protocols 
CPF Types of communication protocols 
CPF1 FF 
type 1 
FF HSE 
 type 5 
FF FMS 
type 9 
CPF2 Control Net                    type  2 
CPF3 Profibus/Profinet           type 3/type 10 
CPF4 P-Net                              type 4 
CPF5 WorldFIP            type 7 
CPF6 Interbus-S type 8 
CPF7 SwiftNet type 6 
 
Note: FF Fieldbus Foundation 
HSE High Speed Ethernet 
 FMS Fieldbus Message Specification 
These protocols are created as open solution, based on 
reference model ISO/OSI. From seventh-layer 
architecture, PROFIBUS uses physical, link and 
applications layer. PROFINET uses physical, link, 
network, transport and applications layer. There are 
several specific profiles of PROFIBUS and PROFINET 
networks:  
• PROFIBUS DP (Decentralised Periphery) and its 
range of transmission technologies, such as RS 485 
(mainly in area of production), Manchester Coded – 
Bus Powered and Intrinsically Safe MBP - S (mainly 
in area of process) and optical fibre,  
• PROFIBUS PA (Process Automation) in 
intrinsically safe area, 
• PROFIBUS FMS (Fieldbus Message Specification); 
this version in the future does not have practical 
imports because of PROFINET development, 
• PROFINET IO (Input/Output) for distributed field 
devices,  
• PROFINET CBA (Component Base Automation) 
for intelligent devices with programmable 
functionality [6]. 
For fail-safe applications within PROFIBUS technology 
was developed profile PROFIsafe, which is merging 
standards of Fail-safe automation and standard 
automation in one technology, running on the same bus 
and using the same communications mechanisms. 
General principles of PROFisafe are described in [1]. 
Safety measures are implemented as extension up 
application layer to so called safety communication 
layer SCL. At present software realisation of PROFIsafe 
by TÜV (Association for Technical Inspection) and BIA 
(National Institution on-the job- safety) is being 
accepted. PROFIsafe is actually standardised in norm 
IEC 61784-3 [7]. This norm defines mechanisms for the 
transmission of safety-relevant messages among 
participants within a distributed network using fieldbus 
technology in accordance with the requirements of IEC 
61508 for functional safety. Standard was discussed for 
the second time in national committee and passed on at 
the section of work group IEC SC65C//WG12. 
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2. BASIC FEATURES OF PROFISAFE 
 
PROFIsafe profile describes the communications 
between Fail-safe peripherals and Fail-safe controllers. 
PROFIsafe provides two operational modes: 
• V1 – is sufficient for the safe data transmission  
using PROFIBUS DP  (versin CPF 3/1),  
• V2 – is used for PROFINET IO (CPF 3/2),  
PROFINET CBA (CPF3/3) and/or PROFIBUS DP. 
PROFIsafe V2 is a uniform profile for both PROFIBUS 
and PROFINET platforms. It can be used in all markets 
including production automation, drive technology, 
motion control and process automation too. PROFIsafe 
with safety integrity level SIL 3 or Category 4 
according to EN 954-1 [8] fulfils the highest safety 
requirements of the process and manufacturing industry. 
Safety-oriented and standard communication is possible 
via one and the same cable (see Fig. 1).  
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 Fig. 1 PROFIsafe profile as extension of standard protocol 
 
The safety layer is independent on the communication 
system, which includes the backplane buses of 
controllers and field devices. PROFIsafe in version V2 
takes into account the special properties of Ethernet 
networks, such as the expanded address space and 
active network components, such as switches and 
repeaters. 
PROFIsafe is based on the experience made in the 
railway signalling technique according to IEC 622280-
1,2 [9]. In this area fail-safe communications is applied 
via standard transmission system, with reserved higher  
communication layers ISO/OSI for Fail-safe measures 
implementation. The safe transmission function 
comprises all measures to discover all possible faults or 
hazards that could be infiltrated by standard 
transmission system and keep the residual error 
probability under certain limit. Measures include: 
• Random function (e.g. Electro-Magnetic 
Interference EMI), 
• Failures of standard hardware, 
• Systematic functions of components within standard 
hardware and software. 
Fail-safe PROFIsafe components have established 
themselves in many safety technology applications 
(from the sensor systems through equipment up to safe 
machines). The standard transmission system includes 
the entire of HW of the transmission system and the 
related protocol function (for PROFIBUS OSI layers 1, 
2, and 7). Safety application and standard applications 
are sharing the same standard PROFINET IO 
PROFIBUS DP communication system at the same 
time. This principle reduces the process of certification 
to safety layer only.  As it is illustrated on the Fig. 2 
within 1, 2 and 7 layers are located function of standard 
transmission system. We suppose black channel with 
the use of non safety relevant components (Application 
Specific Integrated Circuit ASIC, wires, switches …). 
Reserved layer (up application layer) is assigned for 
implementation of the following functions. 
• Safety function of PROFIsafe – includes elements of 
safety related protocol (addressing, watch dog 
timing, sequencing, signatures …). 
• Non safety related functions (e. g. diagnostic). 
• The safe I/O devices and the safe logic controller 
functions (Note: These functions are not part of 
PROFIsafe). 
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3. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY MEASURES  
 
Within PROFIsafe profile the following safety measures 
are required (see in Tab. 2): 
a) consecutive numbering, 
b)  watchdog timer with receipt,  
c) codename for authenticity, 
d) data consistency check.  
 
Safety measures are processed and monitored within 
one Fail-safe unit and are able to eliminate 
communication errors, which can occur during 
transmission of messages (repetition, deletion, insertion, 
resequencing, data corruption, delay, masquerade, 
revolving memory failures within switches). Relation 
between safety measures and communication errors is 
illustrated in Tab.2. 
 
Tab. 2 Safety measures and errors 
 
Safety measures Errors 
a) b) c) d) 
Repetition *    
Deletion * *   
Insertion * * *  
Resequencing *    
Data corruption  *  * 
Delay  *   
Masquerade    * 
Revolving memory 
failures within switches 
*  *  
 
Seeing that within factory or process automation 
different data lengths are transmitted two operational 
modes can be chosen for safety process data unit PDU: 
short mode or long mode.  
PROFIsafe container includes (Fig. 3): 
• F I/O data up to 12 bytes - short mode or up to 123 
bytes - long mode). 
• Status or control byte.  
• Cyclic redundancy check CRC (3 bytes for 12 bytes 
F I/O data or 4 bytes for 123 bytes  F I/O data). 
 
Consecutive number is used for monitoring the 
propagation times between sender and recipient. Value 
“0” is reserved for the first run and for communication 
error reaction. Version V2 uses 24 bit counters for the 
consecutive numbering. Within V2 version is not 
transmitting the consecutive number in every safety 
PDU (in the Fig. 3 part of white colour), but only virtual 
consecutive number, which is reduced to a Toogle Bit 
within a status byte (see Fig. 3) or control byte. 
Counters are located within F-host and F-Device and a 
Toogle Bit (change from 01, 10) increases theirs 
appropriate counters. 
 
Data consistency check is calculated with the use 
mechanisms of Cyclic Redundancy Check CRC. CRC is 
processed across F data, F parameters and consecutive 
number (include bytes in reverse order). F parameters 
are transferred to the F-Device during configuration. F 
parameters are for example source destination or 
codename, safety integrity level SIL and watchdog 
(time monitor). 
 
Time monitor is monitoring the arrival of a new correct 
safety PDU at the F-Device within the watchdog time. 
This verification can be performed as often as 
necessary, but at least once at the end of the monitoring 
time interval. Every corrupted message is counted 
during a configurable SIL monitor time period. The SIL 
monitor shall be implemented within the F-Host only, 
one per safety function (safety control loop). The SIL 
monitor time period is a constant value with the 
dimension hour that result from the requested SIL and 
the configured CRC length. 
 
S S S S S 
S  -  standard message of PROFINET IO 
VCN -  virtual consecutive number 
CRC - cyclic redundancy check 
 
PROFIsafe container = Safety PDU 
F-I/O data 
12-123 Bytes 
Status 
1 Byte 
CRC  
3 or 4 Bytes
VCN 
3 Bytes 
Toogle Bit 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 PROFIsafe container of PROFINET IO 
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4. REACTION IN THE EVENT OF FAIL 
 Repetition, loss, insertion and incorrect sequence 
of message 
The data are transferred cyclically. If some safety 
message is repeated, order of message within 
consecutive numbering is wrong and receiver overwrites 
this message by a correct message. Possible delay of an 
emergency request can be one watchdog time. If some 
safety message is deleted (during transmission 
information was lost), inserted or was modified the 
safety message sequence receiver discovers this events 
by stringently incrementing and examining the 
consecutive number.   
 Corruption of safety data 
Perturbation of data integrity, which was changed 
during data transmission from sender to receiver 
indicates CRC signature. CRC signature is generated 
across the F-parameters (including code name), the F 
I/O data, the virtual consecutive number and the 
control/status byte. Messages in which data integrity 
corruption were detected are not acceptable in the 
receiver side for further processing.  
 Delay of message 
When the operational data exchange exceeds the 
capacity of communication link the messages can be 
delayed. We can detect this type of communication 
error with the following safety measures: consecutive 
number in the sender data and in the acknowledgement 
data and with the use mechanism of watchdog time for 
F-communication. The watchdog time is a part of a 
whole safety time of the safety control loop. The total 
time guaranteed by the safety control system tTOT is the 
sum of the following segments (1): 
 Input delay of the F- Input device (operation 
time) tF/I, 
 Watchdog time of F-communication (between 
F-Input and F-Host) tF/IF/H, 
 Execution time in the F-Host tF/H, 
 Watchdog time of F-communication (between 
F-Host and F-Output) tF/HF/O, 
 Output delay of the F-Output Device 
(operation time) tF/O. 
 Masquarade 
If unauthorised access into communication system is not 
struck out, we must guarantee authenticity of senders 
and receivers. It means that data are coming from the 
correct sender and are going to the correct recipient. 
This authenticity is guaranteed with the use of F-
Parameters as F-Address, determining F source and 
recipient destination relations. With the use of F-
addressing the changes of safety-related messages and 
non-safety related messages and the data from a 
different sender or recipient must be detected.  
 Failures caused with network elements (switches, 
routers) 
Central elements of networks are switches and routers 
(PROFINET only), which belong to the active network 
components. They can have different faults. Messages 
may be sent to the wrong destination or their data 
content can be perturbed.  
The routers connect two or more subnets over 3 levels. 
Every F-Host and F- Devices can be configured to use 
router together with an appropriate address. Possible 
switch and routers faults and reaction after detection are 
recommended in [7]. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper has presented the specifications of   
PROFIsafe profile. It was developed for PROFIBUS 
and PROFINET industrial networks to guarantee safety-
related communications according to norm IEC 61508. 
In the previous parts were analysed  PROFIsafe profile 
and its ability to keep safety integrity level SIL 3. That’s 
the reason why is it used in applications with   the 
highest safety requirements of the process and 
manufacturing industry. 
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